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Abstract
Historically, concepts of sustainability have been articulated in response to a perceived crisis within modernist narratives 
about progress. As such, they are not just environmental concepts, but ethical and political ones. At the same time, they have 
often been accused of being too wedded to many of the same assumptions as these central narratives of modernity, and indeed 
inviting the hubristic mistakes of modernity to be resurrected in the form of pretentions to global stewardship or ‘managing 
the planet’. I respond to some recent critiques of key conceptual elements encountered within sustainability narratives by 
articulating an approach to imagining sustainability that draws on D. W. Winnicott’s concept of the ‘holding environment’, 
and which acknowledges the otherness of the future and of nature, while also affirming responsibilities towards both.
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Introduction
Ulrich Beck identifies a political project that he calls cosmo-
politanism as the only legitimate response to a political and 
social condition in which human flourishing and suffering is 
bound up with human caused risks that affect both humans 
themselves and the non-human world. Cosmopolitanism, he 
proposes, is primarily ‘a radical rediscovery and acknowl-
edgement of the other’, and, inter alia, of ‘the otherness of 
the future’ and ‘the otherness of nature’ (Beck 2005, 285). 
Beck identifies here two barriers to, but also opportunities 
for, imagining sustainability as a political and ethical ori-
entation. How, as part of our conceptual construction of 
responsibilities and of political action, do we acknowledge 
(pay heed to, take care of, represent, recognise) the otherness 
of nature and of the future?
The link between concern for the future and concern for 
the earth is at the heart of sustainability thinking. In sustain-
ability thinking, a sense that the future matters takes on a 
specific weight, mediated by a rethinking of the relationship 
between humanity and nature that challenges many now-
traditional modernist narratives of material human progress. 
Yet how far does this bring nature as such into our ethics 
and politics, and under what framing? Does the concept of 
sustainability enter onto the scene at the cost of misrecognis-
ing the otherness of nature, that is, of framing nature solely 
in terms of its instrumental value for humans? This concern 
is mirrored by a similar concern about how sustainability 
frames the future in ways that still remain within the limi-
tations of modernist ways of thinking, in which the future 
is imagined solely in terms of the continuation of present 
projects, which are then projected into the future in a way 
that colonises future possibilities.
An important distinction can be made here between two 
ways of orienting thought and action towards the future, 
between the future-for-the-present and the present-for-the-
future (Adam and Groves 2007). The easiest way to under-
stand the idea of the future-for-the-present is through the 
example of future discounting, in which economic calcula-
tions are based on an assumed discount rate which ensures 
that the value of future benefits and costs is progressively 
reduced, such that it appears to make economic sense to 
seek to realise the benefits of a decision as soon as pos-
sible, and to push costs further into the future for others 
to bear. A central question about the relationship between 
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sustainability and futurity, then, is to what extent sustainabil-
ity thinking—as well as being potentially instrumental and, 
therefore, anthropocentric—is also present-centric. Perhaps 
not in the same way as future-discounting is, but more in the 
way that its emphasis on preservation and/or conservation 
privileges present evaluations of why non-human entities 
and systems matter over the emergence of future ones. There 
may, therefore, appear to be a tension between concepts of 
sustainability on the one hand, and Beck’s vision of, cos-
mopolitanism, if sustainability does indeed orient human 
agency towards nature as primarily a stock of resources that 
must be preserved, and in addition towards dominant val-
ues in the present as a measure of what may matter to the 
future. The very idea of sustainability may, therefore, be 
ethically and politically suspect. First, because it may pre-
maturely curtail attempts to understand why nature matters 
(in itself as well as for us), and second because it may fail 
to acknowledge how the recognition of whose values matter 
now is shaped by power inequalities, before then consolidat-
ing these inequalities by calling for the ongoing conservation 
of present values for the future.
In particular, concern for the future is often translated 
into the language of posterity, evoked by images of chil-
dren. The scientific, ethical and political uncertainties 
which circulate around arguments about sustainability may 
thus be domesticated through entreaties to extend what is 
essentially parental care to future people, as expressed in 
the statement that one only borrows the earth from one’s 
children. However, such images have particular political 
significance, insofar as they frame concern for the future in 
a form that privileges the perspective of heterosexual par-
ents as the sole legitimate one (Johns-Putra 2017), and thus 
make it harder to publicly represent other possible framings 
of future-oriented concern, particularly in a present where 
political cultures are commonly structured by heterosex-
ism and other forms of oppression (Seymour 2013). Such 
framings domesticate the otherness of the future, easing the 
‘terror of sublime infinity’ (Johns-Putra 2017, 2) stimulated 
by its vastness and unknowability. At the same time, the 
intermediate object of care here—nature, conceived of as 
that fundamental ground on which posterity will continue to 
depend—is also domesticated and drawn out of its unknowa-
bility into a frame of concern that filters care through the 
image of imagined descendants (de Shalit 1995). Domesti-
cation threatens to cross into instrumentalization, however. 
If nature is conceived of as that which sustains us—or our 
children and their children—does this not mean that we will 
(given the limits on our attention and practical capabilities) 
only care for whatever in nature we can currently identify 
as useful? Similarly, if we translate future-oriented concern 
into concern for our posterity, are we not reducing the scope 
of our supposedly cosmopolitan concern to what ‘we’ now 
consider to be important for ‘our’ children? In either case, 
what is valorised is the survival of what is valued in and for 
the present. The future—and nature—are defined through 
and for the present.
Alternatively, concern for the future or for the natural 
world may be expressed through a different temporal fram-
ing, the present-for-the-future. In some texts the future is 
imagined through an apocalyptic lens that is meant to moti-
vate reflection upon values, practices and social structures 
which are currently held to be ‘naturalised’—thus opening 
up space for trying to conceive of how these accepted ele-
ments might change. The future is no longer defined for the 
present; instead, the present is questioned for the future. 
Some suggest, however, that the limits of ethical concern 
here are once again ultimately limited to human survival: 
the addressee of apocalyptic narratives remains, it is argued, 
the individual human subject, politically privileged by pre-
sent political rationalities, whose continuity must be assured 
(Fagan 2017).
In this paper, I map out some aspects of the historical 
emergence of these distinct ways of framing the future 
and nature, and show how they relate to each other as spe-
cific ways of enacting a temporal relation between present, 
past and future. I argue that these positions tend to rest on 
implicit misrepresentations of the relation between self and 
other and, therefore, between human subjects and nature. 
At the same time, recent critiques of the alleged anthropo-
centrism of these positions (such as those made by Fagan) 
commit, I suggest, errors of their own. They tend to afford 
ethical privilege to an unknowable otherness (Beck’s abso-
lute otherness of the future or nature) that, in its sublimity, 
cannot provide any concrete basis for orienting thought or 
action. As an alternative to both these dominant ways of 
understanding sustainability and to critiques thereof, I sug-
gest that a genealogy of concern for the future and for nature 
that draws on phenomenological, development-psychologi-
cal and feminist traditions of thinking about attachment and 
care can provide a distinct basis for thinking about sustain-
ability. It allows the otherness of nature and of the future 
into the sphere of concern as necessary ingredients of any 
concernful engagement with the world, without at the same 
time positing either as purely other, as pure, unknowable 
alterity.
Progress and modernity: the future 
for the present
Nature conceived of as a free input into socially-organ-
ised production processes formed what Marshall Berman 
represents as the modern ‘Faustian’ view of nature, as 
raw material for ceaseless human development (Berman 
1983). This characteristically modern prometheanism is 
also reflected in more avowedly political and utopian ideas 
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of an open future (Adam and Groves 2007), which centre 
on secularised promises of continually refounding com-
munity around a vision of a better world. A new ethical 
and political concern with the future, with ending the past 
and instituting something new and unheard of in its place 
has been invoked as a defining modern mode of tempo-
rality, in intellectual history (Schneewind 1984) but also 
in sociology (Giddens 1999). Modernity is thus seen as 
unique because of its orientation towards the future, rather 
than towards the past. This periodisation simultaneously 
constructs and excludes from the community of modernity 
(Osborne 1995) other communities, such as the medieval 
and the ancient, on the basis of their divergent past-ori-
ented or cyclical temporalities.
This modernist construction of the future is dependent 
on ideas of the transformability of the world, which repro-
duce idealist assumptions about the relationship between 
imagination and material nature (Adam and Groves 2007). 
They draw upon particular historically-contingent knowl-
edge practices. Nature becomes gridded by calculative 
rationalities, defined as fuel for universal human ascent. 
With the 19th century growth of the ‘social state’, respon-
sible for economic policy but also social policy, progress 
became increasingly understood in material and, moreover, 
quantitative terms—what might be called the ‘mechanisa-
tion [Technisierung] of the future (Hölscher 1999) along-
side the standardisation of nature. Metrics such as popu-
lation growth, average life expectancy, or gross domestic 
product (GDP) formed elements around which governance 
regimes that enshrine governance by numbers gained legit-
imacy. As states increasingly took responsibility for the 
health and education of their citizens, the legibility and, 
moreover, the standardisation of their territories become 
more important. Qualitative differences between settle-
ments and regions had to be rendered recordable, com-
parable and commensurable in terms of universal metrics 
(Scott 1998). The contribution of industry and technologi-
cal innovation to ensuring material betterment also gradu-
ally became more important.
Expectations of material improvement in quality of life 
reached a head in the period after WWII within industrial-
ised nations. At the same time, however, earlier challenges 
(Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016) to the hegemony of concep-
tions of material progress were being repeated. Concerns 
about the unforeseen and unwanted consequences of tech-
nological and economic development and particularly 
their impact both on the biosphere and non-industrialised 
nations were widely voiced. Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) 
and the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (1973) report 
both had significant cultural impact. The experiences of 
people of colour and other groups living near polluting 
infrastructure were articulated through movements for 
environmental justice (Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010).
Futures for the present versus presents 
for the future: conceptualising sustainability
The emergence of discourses of sustainable development 
and environmental management can be understood against 
this backdrop. While ideas of sustainable resource man-
agement have a long pedigree reaching back to the 19th 
and even 18th centuries (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016), it 
was arguably in this period that ‘the Environment’ as a 
whole became a new object of bureaucratic management 
(Cooper 1992), objectified and drawn into the purview of 
the administrative state just as earlier the social had been. 
The knowledge practices of ecologists, zoologists, bota-
nists and others became enrolled within this governance 
project, to standardize knowledge practices for measur-
ing and comparing impacts of collective human activity 
upon the natural world. The biophysical world is no longer 
simply raw material for human progress, but becomes 
conceived of as a complex entity, still set over against 
humanity (and thus isolable as an object of management) 
but posited as an ensemble of essential support systems 
(Goodland 1995).
As environmental impacts are transboundary in nature 
and occur within complex systems, they point towards the 
creation of global governance institutions, like the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (Beck 1995). The 
more complex and daunting the project of drawing nature 
into the sphere of governance became, the more the need 
for legibility became urgent. As a result, the need for gov-
ernance by numbers became ever more central to establish-
ing a politics of the environment. Parts per million of  CO2, 
the Simpson and Shannon indices of biodiversity (Spell-
erberg and Fedor 2003), and the nine planetary bounda-
ries (Rockström et al. 2009) became means through which 
sustainability policies were articulated and justified. The 
institutions that characterise modernity, and the practices 
associated with them, have been said to have thus under-
gone a ‘reflexive’ moment (In Beck’s terms), striving to 
contain modernity’s own unintended consequences.
Management narratives
Taking the future into account, and orienting oneself 
towards it as a central element in determining what one 
should do, is part of both progress narratives and what 
we might call reflexive ‘conservation’ narratives. In each 
case, the moral weight accorded to the future is articu-
lated in different ways, but in each case, the non-human 
world (configured as ‘natural capital’ or more recently as 
‘ecosystem services’) becomes the fulcrum around which 
this weight turns. Robert Solow responded to the moment 
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of reflexive modernisation by defending the accumula-
tion of capital as the best way of ensuring that future gen-
erations inherited enough resources to fulfil their needs. 
Importantly, he argued that capital here could include 
natural resources, financial resources but also technologi-
cal resources substituted for natural ones (Solow 1974). 
In other words, the development of technology should be 
seen as a way of providing additional resources that may 
replace and even improve on natural ones in some cases 
(Northcott 2013). Such views are accompanied by an esti-
mate of the social discount rate that should be applied to 
expected costs and benefits of policies, given the assump-
tion that people in the future will be better off (thanks to 
continued material progress). Complementary views are 
also expressed by some proponents of conservation, where 
conservation is seen as the preservation of natural capital 
for the benefit of people now and in the future (Pinchot 
1998, 76–77).
Bryan G. Norton has named the animating spirit of 
such responses the ‘Grand Simplification’ (Norton 2005), 
in which all potential future outcomes are both rendered 
down into material amenable to one metric (measurement 
of capital) and weighed against the primacy of present 
interests. Continuation of current trends towards material 
growth is seen as both natural and desirable, but this sim-
ply enshrines present pattern of consumption as unques-
tionable so long as the future is like the present, but more 
so, characterised by ever-increasing levels of economic 
activity (Fioramonti 2013). The move Solow recommends 
therefore projects futures from the perspective of the pre-
sent, based on the continuation of past trends and the pres-
ervation of present interests. As Fagan (2017, 232) puts it, 
such positions bring the future into the present only insofar 
as they ensure that the ‘future is instead occupied by the 
projection of the present and so is not futural [i.e. not 
other] at all’. Other attempts to present a managerial solu-
tion to the unintended consequences of narratives of pro-
gress run into similar difficulties, even if they are explicitly 
critical of the kinds of position defended by Solow.
More recent (and contested, as we shall see in the next 
section) conservation narratives often seek to preserve 
what formerly may have been defined as natural capital 
by identifying productive powers of non-human nature 
that have economic value insofar as they contribute to 
human wellbeing, a value which can be (speculatively) 
totalled in order to achieve a degree of considerability for 
nature (Costanza et al. 1997). In this way, it is hoped that 
planning futures could incorporate economic relation-
ships within a broader context of productive relationships 
that sustain natural systems, rather than enforcing the 
separation between inert non-human nature and a human 
economy geared to material progress measured in terms 
of financial value productivity.
Valuing ecosystems in this way can be seen, however, 
as still part of commodification, with the effective pricing 
of nature extending property rights further over it, rather 
than curtailing such developments. The commodification 
of nature translates relationships of one kind (sui generis 
complex interdependence between non-human and also 
human entities) into exchange value, with one arbitrarily 
demarcated ‘service’ treated as being effectively substitut-
able for any other in economic terms (Gómez-Baggethun 
and Ruiz-Pérez 2011). Conservation narratives have thus 
been interpreted as modulating, but not ultimately restrain-
ing the drive to treat nature as an inert input. And even if 
economic valuation is just one input into a broader, more 
qualitative valuation, some object that this still defines the 
value of nature predominantly through the lens of human 
interests. Nature is only made to matter insofar as it materi-
ally supports the survival of our descendants. Elements of 
natural systems that appear to have no material value for our 
own survival do not matter.
Even if we shift from a Faustian to a managerial view of 
nature, we thus remain caught within a set of social relations 
through which the meaning of nature is framed (Bookchin 
1980). Even if questions regarding responsibility shift focus 
to include the non-human world, sustainability remains a 
human-centred concept, concerning the conservation of 
what we believe matters to our survival. As Fagan puts it, 
the future is ‘occupied by the projection of the present’. The 
future is extrapolated from what we know of the past (data, 
trends) and present (interests). From modernist progress 
narratives to sustainable management narratives, the future 
remains framed for the present—a present future (Adam and 
Groves 2007).
Apocalyptic narratives: revelation and judgement
The emergence of management narratives was also coeval 
with the emergence of more radical narratives regarding our 
relationship to nature—and to the future. While both these 
kinds of narratives had historical antecedents (Bonneuil and 
Fressoz 2016), something novel about their late 20th cen-
tury forms was the conditions in which they emerged, a cul-
tural moment of what I called earlier (after Beck) reflexivity 
towards the fundamental assumptions that underlie moder-
nity. More radical narratives recognise within this moment a 
deeper crisis, and accordingly alter their orientation towards 
the future and towards nature.
Often, such narratives take on an apocalyptic form, 
employing prophetic language bolstered by scientific data on 
potential destructive trajectories of socio-technical and bio-
physical change. Futures that disrupt or completely erase the 
possibility of modernist progress are imagined. Biospheri-
cal collapse due to runaway climate change, biodiversity 
loss through species extinction, human population growth 
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beyond supportable levels and other worst case scenarios are 
projected. Further, they typically embody the other central 
meaning of apocalyptic narrative, that of judgement as well 
as revelation (Northcott 2013). Dystopian future presents are 
constructed in the form of scenarios to shine a light on what 
is wrong with the present, mirroring in the process some 
trends in science fiction literature.
Stories such as John Brunner’s The Sheep Look Up (1977) 
describe near-futures in which a variety of rebound effects 
combine with social inequalities to degrade or destroy 
human civilisation. Such narratives limn what might appear 
to be fundamental flaws in the relationship between humans 
and nature. The meaning of the present is here defined 
through future possibilities, not the other way around. Sci-
ence fiction has been interpreted as reflecting aspects of the 
present, but also employing the estranging device of some 
novum (typically technological innovation) that enables cer-
tain aspects of the familiar world to be reflected in a future 
mirror, revealing unacknowledged truths about the present 
(Kitchin and Kneale 2001). Deep ecology echoes such narra-
tives by prophetically articulating revelation and judgement 
derived from the future as a call to lay bare and overcome 
culturally-embedded habits of mind in a ‘substantial reori-
entation of our whole civilisation’ (Naess 1990, 45).
A new ethics is then called for, to replace the anthropo-
centric orientations of contemporary societies with biocen-
tric egalitarianism, positioning humans as ‘plain citizens’ of 
nature (Watson 1983). From this perspective, life itself in its 
multiplicitous expressions has intrinsic value, and no form 
of life (including humans) can be assigned superior moral 
value, no matter what capacities it possesses. The human 
power to transform the world does not in itself grant humans 
any right to do so. What does mark humans as special is their 
ability to perturb the webs of mutual interdependence that 
constitute the biosphere, creating destructive consequences 
that also eventually rebound back upon them. Humans 
therefore require nothing less than a cultural revolution in 
consciousness, one which promotes humility in the face of 
nature, to avoid destroying themselves and possibly also the 
rest of life on Earth.
The future (and nature) as wholly other
The concept of sustainability is the result of a reflexive push 
back from within modernity against modernity itself. Sus-
tainability acknowledges but also tames the threat of apoca-
lypse, offering the promise of refounding a coming global 
political community on a renewed narrative of qualitative. 
Things may continue to get better—so long as we are care-
ful. Deeper reformation or even overthrow of present habits, 
practices and institutions is called for by other narratives, as 
in stories of apocalypse or the perspectives of deep ecology. 
But in either case, straining to represent the present for the 
future, as responsible to the future, can be seen as returning, 
once again, to representing the future as a continuation of 
the present by other means.
Fagan (2017) argues that apocalyptic narratives neces-
sarily fall short of recognising the otherness of the future 
and the significance this has for any ethical and political 
discourse of futurity in the present. The problem, she sug-
gests, is that any concrete normative guidance in the face of 
an uncertain future must inevitably reflect the constitution 
of the ‘subject who is projected to inhabit this future’ (239), 
and thus reflect also the conditions under which the subject 
is produced in the present. Instead of hurriedly providing 
new normative guidelines in the face of impending poten-
tial anthropogenic disaster, an appropriate alternative stance 
would, in Derrida’s words quoted by Fagan, be to ‘let the 
future have a future’ (239), and open ‘a space for respon-
sive engagement’ (238) with it. Insofar as there is an ethics 
involved here, it would be one which can be identified (fol-
lowing Zygmunt Bauman) in ‘an ethics of self-limitation’. 
This minimal normativity of humility in face of the future 
(which mirrors the language of deep ecology) would thus 
avoid the risk she sees as implicit in any attempt to codify 
ethically and/or politically responsibilities to the future of 
‘erasing [the future] altogether’ (239). Uncertainty, she pro-
poses, will thus become the material for ethics, rather than 
a barrier to it.
Reconstructing sustainability: 
the non‑human world as constitutive 
of a ‘holding environment’
One of the positions Fagan indicts with the charge of ‘nul-
lifying alterity’ by projecting the future into the present is 
the one I set out in Groves (2014), which explores how phe-
nomenological, developmental-psychological and feminist 
accounts of attachment and care can reorient discussions 
about the place of futurity (and sustainability) away from 
futures-for-the-present. I wish now to revisit this argu-
ment in responding to the problem on which this paper has 
focused—the ways in which sustainability appears to repro-
duce certain features (anthropocentrism and present-focus) 
of modernity while also claiming to escape its limitations. 
Independently, Johns-Putra and Fagan point out how sustain-
ability discourses respond to the reflexive moment within 
modernity by seeking to reform the culture of modernity 
itself. However, they claim mere reform must necessarily be 
inadequate. Fagan (2017) calls instead for an ethics and poli-
tics that acknowledges the radical alterity of the future, and 
the ways in which imagining the future inevitably reduces 
this alterity to a reflection of the present, even if straining 
towards imagining the present for the future. In rehearsing 
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here some key aspects of arguments from Groves (2014) I 
want to outline what I believe Fagan, and Johns-Putra, get 
wrong about the difficulties of bringing futurity and uncer-
tainty into ethics, and to suggest why following Beck in pos-
iting the radical alterity of the future as the basis of ethics 
and politics is a step it is not necessary to take. An alterna-
tive way of understanding the interdependence of humanity 
and nature that concepts of sustainability try to articulate 
can give us a basis for understanding the ethical and politi-
cal significance of sustainability differently. The concepts of 
attachment and care are important here, but rehearsing their 
precise connection is important to avoid associating them 
too closely with images of parental relationships, which, as I 
explicitly argue in Groves (2014, 221–222, n.7), are actually 
inappropriate for understanding the ethical significance of 
futurity and of nature.
Attachment and care beyond the human sphere
The relation between human subjects and the world expe-
rienced as outside, other to, or not reducible to the lived 
experience of the subject cannot be assumed to be a simple, 
fixed binary one. Developmental accounts of subjectivity, 
and in particular those produced from object-relations and 
attachment psychology, show how differentiation from but 
also identification with the external environment are central 
dialectical elements in the gradual emergence of subjectiv-
ity. Further, they recognise that physical and psychic vul-
nerability, together with interdependence and dependence 
are fundamental aspects of the finitude of human beings—a 
human condition (in Hannnah Arendt’s sense) rather than 
a human essence. Vulnerability is physical and psychic, a 
dynamic which involves bodies and selves. Attachments to 
others—beginning, developmentally speaking, with caregiv-
ers—form the flexible and relational armature within which 
subjects are constituted (Groves 2014, 99). For psychologists 
of attachment like Winnicott (1991) differentiation and iden-
tification are moments which resolve out of affective transac-
tions conducted through a transitional or shared space which 
is neither fully subjective nor objective, but out of which the 
meaning of self and other is produced.
For infants, good attachments help create ontological 
stability and security by assisting with the development of 
emotional regulation, transforming potentially disruptive 
and uncontrollable affect into emotions directed at defined 
objects. Stability and security here do not denote rigidly 
fixed boundaries for the self. Instead, for there to be subjec-
tivity at all there needs to develop an emotionally-contoured 
space—a holding environment—in which affects can be 
transformed and played with, thus forming the basis of crea-
tive transformation of the world and self, conducted through 
the disruption and remoulding of the boundaries between the 
two. The structure of this dynamic self-other relationship 
is dialectical, expressed in the way that attachment objects 
come to matter to the self. The other here is valued by and 
valuable to the self in a particular way. As attachment object, 
the other is constitutive of the self. But it is so only insofar 
as it remains other in the sense articulated by Fagan when 
she describe Levinas’ concept of the other ‘completely other 
and impervious to my powers of comprehension and control’ 
(Fagan 2009, 7), as ultimately unknowable to the subject 
and uncontrolled by it, as a source of surprise (Sayer 2011, 
123). In this sense, an evolving attachment relationship 
is structurally similar to that of friendship as analysed by 
Aristotle, which embodies a category of value central to the 
Greek concept of eudaimonia (‘flourishing’). The other as 
friend is recognised by Aristotle as of constitutive value to 
the subject. The other is of constitutive value in this sense 
if its wellbeing is ingredient in the wellbeing of the subject 
(O’Neill 1993, 23–24). It continues to endure as uncontain-
ably other within the relation and only insofar as it does so 
is it valued by the subject.
It is important to appreciate how attachment enacts rela-
tionality to understand the ethical and political significance 
of both futurity and the non-human world. This relationality 
is asymmetrical, yet also two directional, in a sense I shall 
return to in a moment. It also extends further than to human 
others. The Other as conceived of in Levinas’ philosophy is 
a human individual. The radical responsibility not to kill or 
harm the Other he places at the foundation of ethics is sup-
posed to undercut the indifference to the other that Levinas 
traces in modern ethics and politics. This, however, already 
assumes a certain model of subjectivity (Fagan’s ‘modern 
subject’), and in responding to and critiquing such a version 
of subjectivity, it inevitably defines itself partially through 
it (Gottlieb 1994). A genealogical and historical account of 
attachment puts us on a different track. If we follow this 
track, then the isolation and indifference that is often seen 
to characterise the modern subject is shown to be only a 
contingent and culturally particular achievement of certain 
subjects—for example, as a withdrawal response to attach-
ment loss, or to attachments that are felt to imperil the self 
(Benjamin 1990).
Attachment connects, from an early developmental stage 
onward, places, non-humans, and things (possessing, for 
Winnicott, the capacity to ‘enchant’ the human world) to 
human subjects. These also become part of the ‘convoy’ of 
attachments (Antonucci and Akiyama 1994) amidst which 
selves emerge early in life, except of course where such 
attachments are made unavailable—due to displacement, 
violence, or lack of care. Attachments as constitutive val-
ues establish what might be called an ‘implicit solidarity’ 
(Groves 2015, 857) between subject and the human but also 
non-human world, one which means that the subject of good 
attachment is not ‘cast into the world’ as an isolated indi-
vidual but is instead ‘cradled’ within it (Bachelard 1969, 7), 
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held together by it. Later in the developmental process, other 
attachment objects—e.g. practices, institutions and ideals—
can become important ingredients of the shared space or 
holding environment of implicit solidarity between self and 
world.
None of these others confront the subject simply as static, 
sublime Levinasian other who embodies an infinite—and 
infinitely terrifying—demand. Care is both disposition and 
practice (Engster 2007; Ruddick 1980), a response to the 
fundamental relationality of the human subject and its atten-
dant psychic and physical vulnerability that renders itself 
concrete in attentive and respectful taking care of the needs 
of the other. But it is also thereby an attempt to sustain the 
web of attachments that create the relationality of a shared 
transitional space, in which the production of meaning is 
possible (Groves 2014, 117). As such, it cannot be imagined 
as primarily parental, in contrast to what Johns-Putra (2017) 
maintains, as it extends beyond relations between humans. 
This shared space is made from relationships that are asym-
metrical, yet which also run in two directions: attachments 
are constitutive of subjects; subjects are called to respond 
to their attachments. The shared space is one of uneven and 
non-symmetrical interdependence. It through this shared 
space that the psychological components of processes of 
recognition (and indeed the relational logic of recognition 
itself) are laid down, though this subject lies beyond the 
scope of this paper.
Within the shared space, futurity is the horizon of the 
still-to-be-determined collective fate of subjects and their 
attachments—which first introduces the primary ethical 
and political question, ‘how shall I/we live?’ Attachment 
implicitly contains within it a wish for a future that may 
or may not be possible to fulfil (Berlant 2011), a wish to 
sustain the shared space as a source of meaning, and thus 
also orients the self towards the future flourishing of signifi-
cant others. These others—including places, objects, prac-
tices, institutions and even ideals—have to be understood 
as dramatis personae within linked narratives, for whom 
things can turn out better or worse. Understanding what ‘bet-
ter’ and ‘worse’ mean here is impossible without relying 
on knowledges of various kinds, expert and lay. Without 
determinate ways of imagining the future, it is impossible 
to actually respond to the otherness of the other who is the 
object of care. The other person who I nurse through ill-
ness, the landscape I fight to protect, the ideals of justice or 
equality I struggle to see realised—all these are constitutive 
of a common space that is productive of the meaning of the 
world. But this meaning only emerges because for all these 
attachments, things could go better or worse in determinable 
ways (recovering or sickening, being despoiled or flourish-
ing, being vindicated or betrayed). The future as horizon of 
meaning is projected through the shared space of attachment 
relationships. Ultimately, it is the possibility of the shared 
space that is the object of care itself, which keeps the future 
open (and, therefore, to some extent unknowable).
Attachment and care are not just the connective tissue 
of ethical life. They also open up a difficult path between 
private and public life, between ethics and politics. Attach-
ment objects are—implicitly or explicitly—public things, 
constitutive of a holding environment that is shared more 
widely and which shape the (not necessarily universally) 
shared commitments through which we enter into political 
life, into a life where public objects of attachment need tend-
ing (Honig 2012, 65). Care, in the sense outlined here, is 
thus not simply a motivational slogan addressed to individu-
als (pace Fagan 2017). Care is a morally but also existen-
tially necessary component of interdependence and vulner-
ability (Engster 2007). It may not always be exercised, or 
even be exercisable, given surrounding conditions. But its 
necessity remains. To tend to private or public objects of 
attachment enjoins us to follow paths that criss-cross back 
and forth between the private and public realms, in the forms 
in which they have been historically constituted. Speaking 
up for urban parks connects us back to the individual and 
personal meanings through which the common fate of these 
places and those who enjoy them are woven together. Car-
ing for a sick relative connects us to health institutions, to 
the practices and rules that define how professionals within 
them operate, and to the funding decisions which shape 
how these institutions themselves (for which we may feel 
a sometimes angry and frustrated affection, as is often said 
of the National Health Service in the UK) are materially 
sustained. It enjoins us to know and critically examine the 
wider structures we rely on. Care, as a moral and existential 
necessity, requires us to sustain private and public holding 
environments, and in doing so, extend ourselves deeper into 
relationships between those others for whom we care and 
further out into the material and psychic relations that sus-
tain them. It requires attentiveness to attempt to understand 
the needs of others. This implies restraint insofar as one 
should not assume one already knows the other’s needs, but 
also assumes these needs can be understood, if never per-
fectly. The difference between the other’s past and his/her/
its future represents a gap within which a response can be 
improvised. Care thus represents a programme of ethical and 
political enlargement, not self-limitation (Baier 1995, 19).
How does this orientation towards futurity, born 
of attachment, connect us to nature, and thereby to the 
future beyond our own personal lives and the attachments 
which sustain them? Care begins from human concerns 
and what experience has taught us to value. The fact of 
attachment is thus contingent. But attachment and care 
themselves are not. Insofar as there is ethical or political 
motivation at all, they revolve around private and public 
things which are generative of meaning and which call 
us to individual and collective action. Just as better and 
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worse forms of attachment, and better and worse forms 
of care in response to attachment, can be identified by 
understanding individual biographies, better and worse 
forms of collective attachment that enable or deny ethical 
and political agency to specific actors can be identified 
through an understanding of history. The question is then 
to what extent these succeed in recognising others’ needs, 
given that recognition is never perfect, as McLaren (2017) 
points out, and also to what extent they acknowledge the 
wider interdependencies that sustain those who are their 
subjects (Marris 1996). Nature enters into the sphere of 
value defined by care, not primarily as an instrumental 
resource, but as a constitutive other. The dependence of 
human society on this other is primarily and experien-
tially felt through processes like place attachment, not 
through more abstract forms of knowledge that confirm its 
instrumental value. The meaning of the non-human world 
comes from repeated singular encounters, and only later 
perhaps is broadened through attachment to ideals that 
articulate background reasons about why the non-human 
world matters.
The non-human biosphere is thus a constitutive other 
within the holding environment in which subjectivity first 
emerges. It can only provide this ‘service’ to the subject, 
however, insofar as it remains other, i.e. is encountered in 
forms that reveal themselves but also, as living and non-
living entities, recede and remain within themselves and in 
their complex relations to the rest of the biosphere, never 
wholly graspable. Possessing their own good, the enti-
ties and relationships of which the biosphere is composed 
can be tended—and shaped. How they should be tended 
and shaped is dependent, first, on situated practices that 
embody (or fail to embody) the virtues or dispositions of 
care. Second, it is dependent on norms. But determining 
what norms apply is a project of innovation and experi-
mentation, as it is dependent on the outcome of a transac-
tive play of boundaries of knowledge and action that can 
be more or less attentive and respectful. But the outcome 
of such interactions has to be judged according to how they 
actually enhance or degrade the narratives, as we struggle 
to understand them, to which belong the things tended and 
for whose needs we claim to speak. The very otherness of 
these others means that, ultimately, the sphere of tending 
will be more or less radically circumscribed, even if we 
aim to extend it, as our knowledge will necessarily become 
more limited the further it seeks to extend in space and 
time. But such a response is demanded by both our attach-
ments and the systems and structures, human and non-
human, on which they in turn depend. Responsibility is 
not infinite in the sense Bauman (1993) stipulates. Infinite 
responsibility is simply responsibility without response-
ability. A determinate response, enacting practices which 
may fall short of the norms we use to make sense of and 
evaluate them, is necessary. Violence towards the other is 
the risk of response, but to not respond, and instead sim-
ply shrink back from an otherness to which we are always 
already related is also violence (Lloyd 2008).
In this way, drawing on the account of attachment and 
care given in Groves (2014) the non-human world does not 
occupy the same position as it does in the various ways of 
thinking about sustainability we have explored. It is not con-
ceptualised solely as the material basis for sustaining the 
human future (futures for the present). Nor are its possible 
futures the material for worst-case scenarios through which 
judgement can be passed on (some) present values (presents 
for the future). Instead, it the ultimate support for human 
care, but also a meaningful and meaning-conferring other 
within the sphere of human care that also exceeds its reach. 
As the latter, it is thus ingredient in the holding environment 
through which the future first becomes an issue for human 
beings, and which existentially places us in a position that 
demands our care. The common fate of selves and others 
related through the holding environment makes the intan-
gible future tangible and actionable, while also commend-
ing to us a humility that is nonetheless attentive and active, 
committed to translating care for the needs of the irreducibly 
other into action.
The holding environment as relation to the future
This presents us with a different way of beginning to articu-
late a politics and ethics of the futurity which sustainability 
needs to embody. If the future is wholly other in the sense 
that no determinate relation to it is possible or legitimate, 
then the only relation to it can be a static one, frozen in the 
face of an infinite demand to hold back. All imagination 
and representation extended forward to grasp the future are 
indicted, meaning that the only ethically appropriate actual 
response would be to ‘decreate’ the self (Rose 1993, 217), 
to disavow thought and agency in face of the Other to whom 
all representation must necessarily do unjustifiable violence. 
But if the otherness here is an intrinsically unimaginable 
future which cannot be represented in any way without ille-
gitimately capturing it in the discursive grids that frame the 
present, then all that is left is to disavow the political cul-
tures of modernity and simply await the future, in the hope 
of an ‘absolute beginning’ (Bauman 1993, 93), waiting for 
a new ethical and political community to be founded. This, 
however, is a stance which ironically remains caught in that 
characteristically modern way of relating to the future that 
treats it as the end of the past and the coming of the unheard 
of novum (Babich 2013)—only at the same time forswear-
ing all agency, and instead simply awaiting this end and new 
beginning.
By contrast, the holding environment of attachments 
and their supporting conditions embodies connective tissue 
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of an always contested and partially articulated world, but 
in doing so, gives us the capabilities to anticipate not only 
the futures of those things we care about, but to extend and 
transform the scope of what we do care about as we come 
to understand the dependencies of the objects of our care. 
In doing so, private and public things serve as the material 
for narratives out of which private and collective identities 
emerge. They offer us the basis for a ‘political morality of 
uncertainty’, of anticipating, not the specific objects which 
future people will care about, and thus simply reducing the 
future to the projection of the present, but of anticipating 
instead the kinds of structuring relations through which any 
care can be expressed as good enough care, to attachments 
which promote genuine modes of self-determination and 
solidarity with the human and non-human worlds (Groves 
2014, 161–62). This positions future people, neither as 
submerged within the otherness of the future, nor as sim-
ple reflections of us, but as potential and always other co-
creators of something ethically and politically valuable (de 
Shalit 1995, 118–119), a world composed of things mean-
ingful both privately and publicly. While these things and 
the holding environments that contain them are historically 
contingent, some such worlds are nonetheless necessarily 
better than others.
This is why Fagan is incorrect when she states that a care-
based ethics and politics of futurity is based on a concept 
of interdependence that ‘is nonetheless predominantly uni-
directional’ (2017, 236). Caring about the future is asym-
metrical, but then so is all care. The future remains, however, 
the dimension of the present in which the narratives of what 
we care about shall be played out, and where their continu-
ing worth (and the meaning of our own lives) will also be 
evaluated (O’Neill 1993). Anticipating the care of others is 
also trying to anticipate what our legacy will mean to them, 
a difficult but necessary task. Again, simply reverting to an 
ethics of self-restraint that seeks to avoid positing any future 
for fear of illegitimately representing the unrepresentable 
here is simply to accept the violence that has already been 
done to the future in the name of the present.
Conclusion
Discourses of sustainability arise out of, and preserve within 
them, a dilated cultural moment in which core norms and 
practices of modernity undermine themselves, riven with 
anxiety that erodes the ways in which modernity’s habits 
of mind and knowledge practices constructed the relation-
ship between past and future. Different attempts to articulate 
how sustainability might be an anchor for new practices and 
norms, as we saw, take up different ways of reconstructing 
this relationship, in more or less radically reformatory ways. 
Anxiety is always an existential accompaniment, as Gillian 
Rose has argued, to experiences where practices and norms 
no longer fit with each other (Rose 1996). Disruptive expe-
riences of this kind are exemplified by bereavement, typi-
cally understood as a loss of attachment which lays waste 
the relationship between self and world, requiring each to 
be reconstructed (Nussbaum 2003). ‘How should one live’, 
and ‘what is permitted’ are collective questions and anxieties 
at the same time as personal ones, questions which demand 
that practices evolve and norms be articulated around them 
in ways that fit together once more, after an experience of 
loss. Sustainability contains within it conflicts between the 
limits of knowledge and the need of ethics and politics which 
appear irresolvable.
I have advocated in this paper that to recognise and work 
through this anxiety cannot be done by doing as Beck advo-
cates and simply positing the future as alterity, as this effec-
tively denies the relationship to the future that is already 
part of our historical experience. Instead of articulating 
sustainability as the basis of a new, abstract global com-
munity somehow united in self-restraint or in a new, techno-
logically-mediated commitment to progress, it is necessary 
to recognise that present subjects are related to the future 
unevenly and differentially through attachments and commit-
ments that anchor them in the political field here and now. 
These commitments to private and public things shape and 
orient their individual and collective capabilities for action. 
It is only by asking to what extent these attachments build 
relationships that can sustain enlarged care for others now 
and in the future that sustainability can be fleshed out. Mak-
ing sustainability a concrete way of working through the 
multi-decadal collapse of progress narratives requires the 
improvisation of shared practices that effectively embody 
care for the world and solidarity with future people, and 
the articulation of norms that will help us both locate our-
selves as performers of these practices, and trouble us with 
their insufficiency as ways of expressing our responsibility 
to whoever comes after us. Responsibility is irresponsible 
unless it is transformed into an actual response.
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